Charles Krauthammer: Mission Accomplished II

The physicist Wolfgang Pauli once remarked to a colleague about the lecture they were attending, noting that the speaker was so off the mark that "he isn't even wrong." I often have the same feeling reading Charles Krauthammer’s mediocre missives in the Washington Post. According to Krauthammer, Iraq is on the verge of turning out as a major strategic accomplishment for the United States. Before Krauthammer declares Mission Accomplished II, however, there are some inconvenient facts he needs to reckon with.

Krauthammer argues that an enduring U.S. military presence in Iraq will insure America has a critical ally in the heart of the Middle East. Neither the American people nor the Iraqis have signed on to the idea having permanent U.S. bases in Iraq. If the heavily fortified bunker complex that is the Green Zone is any indication, then America’s presence will be like Fort Apache in injun territory – i.e., an unwelcome presence that continues to fuel extremist resentment against what the jihadists view as an imperial and infidel occupation. Put simply, a large American footprint in Iraq is more likely to inspire extremism than defuse it.

General Petraeus’ counterinsurgency strategy is certainly a marked improvement over what came before. However, the welcome reduction in violence probably has much to do with the fact that many of the factions in Iraq are simply waiting the Americans out. They know, for instance, that the surge is temporary and that the Bush administration’s days are numbered. As one Iraqi put it, the current lull in violence is part of the "great deception" as the various Iraq militias prepare for the day when the United States is forced to scale back forces. Iraqis various factions, after all, would rather fight one another tomorrow than take on American firepower today.

What are the prospects for a political reconciliation in Iraq? The whole point of the surge, after all, was to buy time for the various factions to hammer out oil revenue sharing agreements and the like. In fact, pervasive corruption and black market activity – not to mention the reality that petro-politics in the Middle East is a invariably a zero-sum game – makes it highly unlikely that the various factions can arrive at a sustainable political settlement. Presently, the U.S. military is buying off Iraq’s private militias (convincing them it is better to take our money than fight us), but unless the Bush administration can manage a breakthrough on the political front this approach is likely to prove ephemeral.

The Iraq war must be understood in the context of our larger strategic interests. It has hampered our efforts in Afghanistan, diverted resources from capturing or killing bin Laden, worked to the advantage of America’s chief adversary in the region (Iran), and radicalized a new generation of anti-American extremists. The invasion of Iraq has also decimated America’s credibility, leaving it isolated and drained at a time when China appears on a trajectory to eclipse the United States within the next several decades. The extraordinary costs of the whole enterprise (by some estimates the invasion will cost each American $9,250 by the end of the decade), coupled with a very uncertain potential payoff (a less radicalized Arab world), make the whole venture seem about as sensible as buying Lotto tickets to avoid foreclosing on a mortgage one can’t afford.

The historian Arnold Toynbee observed that societies that remake themselves are more apt to succeed than societies that attempt to remake the rest of the world. Would the United States be better off investing in its own infrastructure and the energy efficiencies and alternative fuels of the future than pouring money into Iraq? We have truly outsourced our future. Of course, neoconservatives like Krauthammer will never admit just how far off the mark they’ve been all along.

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