Wednesday, October 01, 2008

McCain vs. Obama: Strategy vs. Tactics


President Bush insists that the United States has a strategy to defeat terrorism. Most counter terrorism experts, however, have concluded that Bush’s strategy is incoherent or counterproductive. In simple terms, Bush’s strategic vision rests on the following assumptions: (1) undemocratic regimes spawn terrorism because they stifle economic, political, and religious freedoms. (2) Repression breeds violence and resentment, which tends to be aimed at peaceful and successful democracies. (3) Therefore, spreading liberty is best long-term antidote to reducing and eliminating the animus that gives rise to terrorism.

Helping Iraq make the transition from dictatorship into a democracy is, in Bush’s view, the catalyst necessary to transform the entire Middle East. It’s an appealing notion – and it is not without some merit – but it is a dangerously simplistic approach to a very complex challenge. Put simply, Bush fails to understand is that terrorism is the flip side of globalization, a movement where individuals and small groups are gaining power at the expense of nation states. In the past, when non-state actors had grievances their means for wrecking havoc were limited. But now, thanks to the information revolution, disaffected entities are rapidly gaining access the most destructive technologies. It is probably only a matter of time before fringe elements acquire WMD.

America’s homegrown terrorist, Timothy McVeigh, was a product of a prosperous democracy. Similarly, the perpetrators of Columbine style mass shootings invariably hail from the freest of free societies. Spreading democracy will in no way diminish the murderous madness of demented loners, irrational cults, and other fringe elements.

Nevertheless, Bush insists that winning in Iraq will deflate the terrorists, by which he means al-Qaeda. The resurgence of al-Qaeda in Pakistan and the Taliban in Afghanistan contradicts the president’s claims. The United States may well prevail in Iraq (by achieving a tolerable outcome), but this “success” will be offset by setbacks in Pakistan and elsewhere.

At best, Iraq is looking like a tactical success, but a strategic debacle. In chess, it doesn’t matter how many pieces you win if you can’t protect your king. Similarly, winning in Iraq means virtually nothing when one appreciates that the United States under the Bush administration has lost its moral authority, it’s financial health, and its role as a global leader. The United States is a vastly weaker country because it invaded Iraq.

This brings me to the point in the first McCain/Obama debate, where the senator from Arizona accused his opponent of failing to understand the difference between tactics and strategy. If anything, the lesson of distinguishing tactics from strategy appears to be lost on McCain, in so far as he views Iraq as the make or break issue for the United States. We can continue to spend $10 billion dollars a week in Iraq – so long as the Chinese and other foreign creditors continue to lend us the money – while our own infrastructure crumbles and our healthcare system collapses. But the tradeoffs of remaining in Iraq are becoming more and more apparent.

At the end of the First World War, Germany won a series of tactical battles that actually undermined their military’s strategic position. The German public could hardly believe that their heroic victories were for naught. We may be in for a similarly bitter lesson. Those who fail to have a sound strategy, and those who elevate tactics above strategy, usually defeat themselves.

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